Abstract: Artificial intelligence is part of our daily lives. Whether working as taxi drivers, financial analysts, or airport security, computers are taking over a growing number of tasks once performed by people. As this occurs, computers will also cause the injuries inevitably associated with these activities. Accidents happen, and now computer-generated accidents happen. The recent fatality caused by Tesla's autonomous driving software is just one example in a long series of "computer-generated torts."
Under current legal frameworks, manufacturers (and retailers) of computer tortfeasors are likely strictly responsible for their harms. This article argues that where a manufacturer can show that an autonomous computer, robot, or machine is safer than a reasonable person, the manufacturer should be liable in negligence rather than strict liability. The negligence test would focus on the computer's act instead of its design, and in a sense, it would treat a computer tortfeasor as a person rather than a product. Negligence-based liability would create a powerful incentive to automate when doing so would reduce accidents, and it would continue to reward manufactures for improving safety.
In fact, principles of harm avoidance suggest that once computers become safer than people, human tortfeasors should no longer be judged against the standard of the hypothetical reasonable person that has been employed for hundreds of years. Rather, individuals should be measured against computers. To appropriate the immortal words of Justice Holmes, we are all "hasty and awkward" compared to the reasonable computer.
I. INTRODUCTION
An automation revolution is coming, and it is going to be hugely disruptive.1 Ever cheaper, faster, and more sophisticated computers are now able to do the work of people in a wide variety of fields and on an unprecedented scale. They may do this at a fraction of the cost of existing workers, and in some instances, they already outperform their human competition.2 Today's automation is not limited to manual labor; modern machines are already diagnosing disease,3 conducting legal due diligence,4 and providing translation services.5 For better or worse, automation is the way of the future-the economics are simply too compelling for any other outcome.6 But what of the injuries these automatons will inevitably cause? What happens when a machine fails to diagnose a cancer, ignores an incriminating email, or inadvertently starts a war?7 How should the law respond to computer-generated torts?
Tort law has answers to these questions based on a system of common law that has evolved over centuries to deal with unintended harms.8 The goals of this body of law are many: to reduce accidents, promote fairness, provide a peaceful means of dispute resolution, reallocate and spread losses, promote positive social values, and so forth.9 Whether tort law is the best means for achieving all of these goals is debatable, but jurists are united in considering accident reduction as one of the central, if not the primary, aims of tort law.10 By creating a framework for loss shifting from injured victims to tortfeasors, tort law deters unsafe conduct.11 A purely financially motivated rational actor will reduce potentially harmful activity to the extent that the cost of accidents exceeds the benefits of the activity.12 This liability framework has far-reaching and sometimes complex impacts on behavior. It can either accelerate or impede the introduction of new technologies.13
Most injuries people cause are evaluated under a negligence standard, which requires unreasonable conduct to establish liability. However, when computers cause the same injuries, a strict liability standard applies. This distinction has significant financial consequences and corresponding impact on the rate of technology adoption.14 It discourages automation, because machines entail greater liability than people. It also means that in cases where automation will improve safety, the current framework to prevent accidents now has the opposite effect.
This Article argues that the acts of autonomous computer tortfeasors should be evaluated under a negligence rather than a strict liability standard in cases where an autonomous computer is occupying the position of a reasonable person in the traditional negligence paradigm, and where automation is likely to improve safety. For the purposes of ultimate financial liability, the computer's manufacturer/retailer should still be responsible for satisfying judgments under standard principles of product liability law.
This Article employs a functional approach to distinguish an autonomous computer, robot, or machine from an ordinary product.15 Our relationship with technology has changed. Computers are no longer just inert tools directed by individuals. Rather, in at least some instances, computers are given tasks to complete and determine for themselves how to complete those tasks. For instance, a person could instruct a self-driving car to take them from point A to point B, but would not control how the machine does so. By contrast, a person driving a conventional vehicle from point A to point B controls how the machine travels. This distinction is analogous to the distinction between employees and independent contractors, which centers on the degree of control and 15 Terms such as "robot," "machine," "artificial intelligence, "machine intelligence," and even "computer" are not used consistently even in the scientific literature. This Article uses self-driving cars as a case study to demonstrate the need for a new torts paradigm.18 There is public concern over the safety of self-driving cars, but a staggering 94 percent of crashes involve human error. These contribute to around 35,000 fatalities a year in the U.S. at a cost of about $242 billion.19 Automated vehicles may already be safer than human drivers, but if 16 See, Yewens v Noakes (1880) 6 QBD 530 ("...a servant is a person who is subject to the command of his master as to the manner in which he shall do his work.") 17 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, I Think Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57(4) B.C.L.R 1079, 1083-1091 (2016) (discussing types of machine architectures including conventional knowledge based systems with expert rules as well as types of machine intelligence algorithms that result in unexpected machine behavior). 18 Others have written about tort liability and self-driving vehicles, although primarily dealing with how existing law deals with accidents involving autonomous vehicles. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, "Sophisticated Robots": Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803 (2014) (arguing, using the example of self-driving vehicles, that the current framework provides an "appropriate balance of innovation and liability for personal injury."); see also, Jeffrey K. Gurney benefit from the experience of directly having treated millions of patients, and be immune to fatigue?26
The remaining Article is divided into three Parts. Part II provides background on the historical development of injuries caused by machines and how the law has evolved to address these harms. It discusses the role of tort law in injury prevention and the development of negligence and strict product liability. Part III argues that while some forms of automation should prevent accidents, tort law may act as a deterrent to adopting safer technologies. To encourage automation and improve safety, this Part proposes a new categorization of "computer-generated torts" for a subset of machine injuries. This would apply to cases in which an autonomous computer, robot, or machine is occupying the position of a reasonable person in the traditional negligence paradigm, and where automation is likely to improve safety. This Part contends that the acts of computer tortfeasors should be evaluated under a negligence standard rather than under principles of product liability, and it goes on to propose rules for implementing the system. Finally, Part IV argues that once computer operators become safer than people, and automation is practical, the "reasonable computer" should become the new standard of care. This Article is focused on the effects of automation on accidents, but automation implicates a host of social concerns. It is important that policy makers act to ensure that automation benefits everyone. Automation may increase productivity and wealth, but it may also contribute to unemployment, financial disparities, and decreased social mobility. These and other concerns are certainly important to consider in the automation discussion, but tort liability may not be the best mechanism to address every issue related to automation. 26 See, e.g., Saul N Weingart, et al., Epidemiology of Medical Error, 320 BMJ 774, 775 (2010) (discussing some of the causes of human medical error).
II. LIABILITY FOR MACHINE INJURIES

A Brief History
Injuries caused by machines are nothing new. For as long as people have used machines injuries have resulted-and machines have been with us for quite some time. The earliest evidence of simple machines, which are tools that redirect force to make work easier like pulleys and levers, dates back millions of years to the beginning of the Stone Age.27 In fact, the Stone Age is so named because it was characterized by the use of stone to make simple machines such as hand axes.28 The primary function of these tools was to hunt and cut meat,29 but they were also used to facilitate violence against people.30 Machines used in the furtherance of intentional torts were likely used negligently as well. Given that home knife accidents lead to about a third of a million emergency room visits a year in the U.S., it is not difficult to imagine that during the Stone Age these simple machines caused accidents.31
As history progressed, and the use and complexity of simple machines grew, so too did the The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/knife-injuries-and-other-kitchenmishaps-afflict-both-top-chefs-and-everyday-cooks/2013/01/07/92e191f8-4af0-11e2-b709-667035ff9029_story.html. 32 For example, around a half a million people died building the Great Wall of China, although the number of these deaths due to machine injuries is unknown. Gregory P Guyton, A Brief History of Workers' Compensation, Iowa 19 Orthop. J. 106-7, 1999. So common were machine and industrial injuries in the ancient world that ancient Greek, Roman, Arab, and Chinese laws provided for compensation schedules for accidents. See id. Under ancient Arab law, "loss of a joint of the thumb was worth one-half the value of a finger. The loss of a penis was compensated by the amount of length lost, and the value an ear was based on its surface area." Id. 33 44 Id. Lost quality of life from those injuries is valued at an addition $3,611.5 billion. Id. 45 Id. 46 Tort law "primarily grew out of a focus on bodily injury and physical property damage, but protection has been extended beyond the physical to include harm to reputation, privacy, emotional well-being, and economic loss." Dominick R. Vetri, et al., THE FUNCTIONS AND GOALS OF TORT LAW 5 th ED, 3 (2016) (hereinafter "Vetri"). "The range of torts is as broad as human experience and includes such wrongful conduct as negligence (personal injury law for unintentional harm), intentional torts (e.g., assault and battery), products liability (defective products), abnormally dangerous activities liability (e.g., blasting, aerial pesticide spraying), nuisance (e.g., air, water, and noise pollution), defamation (libel and slander), privacy invasion (private areas intrusion and personal autonomy interference), and fraud A tort is a harmful civil act, as opposed to a criminal act, other than under contract, where one person is damaged by another, and it gives way to a right to sue.47 A variety of goals have been proposed for tort law: to reduce accidents, promote fairness, provide a peaceful means of dispute resolution, reallocate and spread losses, promote positive social values, and so forth.48 Whether tort law is the best means for achieving all of these goals is a matter of endless dispute.49 However, jurists are united in considering accident reduction as one of the central goals of tort law, if not the primary goal.50 By creating a framework for loss shifting from injured victims to tortfeasors, tort law deters unsafe conduct.51 A purely financially motivated rational actor will reduce potentially harmful activity to the extent that the cost of accidents exceeds the benefits of the activity.52
On a broader level, the law of torts is one of the primary ways in which society choses to allocate liability. And allocating liability has far-reaching and sometimes complex impacts on behavior. In its quest to reduce accidents, tort law can either accelerate the introduction of new technologies, as was the case with the use of glaucoma testing and pulse oximeters, or it can discourage the use of new technologies, as is usually the case where the standard of care is based on custom.53 (misrepresentation). Tort law study also includes consideration of legislative measures related to tort liability, for example, automobile no-fault systems and the 9-11 compensation system." Id. 47 Torts are typically categorized based on the level of fault they require (or based on the interests they protect). On one end of the spectrum are intentional torts involving intent to harm or malice, on the other are strict liability torts which do not require fault. Covering the "great mass of cases" in the middle are harms involving negligence.54
Negligence
The concept of negligence is the primary theory through which courts deal with accidents and unintended harms.55 In practice, for a plaintiff to prevail in most personal injury cases, he or she must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care, that the defendant breached that duty, that the breach caused the plaintiff's damages, and that the plaintiff suffered compensable damages. This generally requires proof that the defendant acted negligently, which is to say, unreasonably considering foreseeable risks. This standard is premised on what an objective and hypothetical "reasonable" person would have done under the same circumstances.56 Thus, if a reasonable person would not have headed out to sea without a radio to warn of storm conditions,57 manufactured a ginger beer with a snail inside,58 or dropped heavy objects off the side of a building,59 then these activities could expose a defendant to liability. 54 Negligence strikes a balance between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. Society has interests in reducing injuries and compensating victims as well as encouraging economic growth and progress.60 One of the ways that tort law attempts to achieve this balance is by permitting recovery in negligence only where there has been socially blameworthy conduct.61 Thus, where a defendant has acted reasonably, even if the defendant has caused serious injury to a plaintiff, there will be no liability. Juries play a key role in determining the reasonable person standard as applied to the facts of a case.62
Strict & Product Liability
While negligence governs virtually all accidents, there are exceptions. For instance, defendants may be strictly liable for harms they cause as a result of certain types of activities such as hazardous waste disposal and blasting.63 Strict liability is a theory of liability without fault; it is essentially based on causation without regard to whether a defendant's conduct is socially blameworthy.64 Thus, a defendant corporation which takes every reasonable care to prevent injury before dusting crops may nevertheless find itself liable for injuries it causes to a bystander.
One of the most important modern applications of strict liability is to product liability.
Product liability refers to responsibility for the commercial transfer of a product that causes harm because it is defective or its properties are falsely represented.65 Product injuries cause upwards of 60 Vetri at 12. 61 See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1908) . 62 Vetri at 10. 63 Id. at 11. 64 See, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, 2 L.Q. REV. 52 (1886). While early English common law imposed strict liability for certain wrongs such as trespass, Rylands was the progenitor of the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, and its ruling had a major impact on the development of tort law. In the case, Fletcher's reservoir burst and flooded a neighboring mine run by Rylands through no fault of Fletcher. This court held that "the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." Id. Critics of the case objected to its potential impact on economic activity. See, e.g., Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 443, 445-46 (1873) (repudiating Rylands, and stating, "liberal principles of formal equality and economic freedom, or a devotion to economic development, required rejection of tort liability without fault"). 65 David G. Owen. OWEN'S PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 3
RD ED (Hornbook Series) 1 (2015).
200 million injuries a year.66 In most instances, manufacturers (and retailers) are strictly liable for defective products. The bulk of product liability cases involve claims for damages against a manufacturer or retailer by a person injured while using a product.67 Typically, a plaintiff will try to prove that an injury was the result of some inherent defect of a product or its marketing, and that the product was flawed or falsely advertised.68 Defendants, in turn, attempt to prove that their products were reasonably designed, properly made, and accurately marketed.69 Defendants may argue that plaintiff injuries were the result of improper and unforeseeable use of the product, or that something other than the product caused the harm.70
Product liability was not always governed by strict liability. Originally, American courts followed the English doctrine of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) for product liability claims, reflecting a national philosophy embracing individualism and free enterprise. 87 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. , 61 Cal.2d 256, 262-263. "Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products. In some cases the retailer may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer's strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course of their continuing business relationship." Id (internal citations omitted).
III. COMPUTER-GENERATED TORTS
Automation Will Prevent Accidents
On May 7, 2016, a Tesla driver was killed in the first known fatal crash of a self-driving car.88 Tesla reported that the autopilot system did not apply the brakes after the car's sensor system failed to detect an 18-wheel truck and trailer. uncomfortable with self-driving vehicles on the road, and more than three quarters would want to retain a steering wheel.95 Regulators are more optimistic than the public, but they are still cautious.96 California until very recently required human drivers to be present in all self-driving cars being tested on public roads.97 Two new laws passed in 2016 now permit unmanned vehicles to operate on public roads under certain circumstances.98
Yet much of the public discourse on self-driving cars is misguided. The critical issue is not whether computers are perfect (they are not), but whether they are safer than people (they are).
Nearly all crashes involve human error.99 A human driver causes a fatality about every 100 million miles, resulting in tremendous human and financial costs.100 The U.S. Department of Transportation reports that more than 35,000 people died from motor vehicle accidents in the U.S. in 2015. It estimates the economic costs of those accidents at over $240 billion.101
By contrast, the Tesla fatality was the first known autopilot death in about 130 million miles driven by the system.102 It is also important to note that driverless technologies are in their infancy. Imagine how improved such technologies will be in 10 years. One academic expert predicted in September of 2016 that self-driving cars will be 10 times safer than human drivers in 95 David Neal, Over Half of Brits Won't Feel Safe Using the Streets With Driverless Cars, The Inquirer, Oct. 17, 2016, http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2474351/over-half-of-brits-wont-feel-safe-using-the-streets-with-driverlesscars. 96 However, the report estimated that self-driving technologies would not be widely enough adopted to permit this outcome until the middle of the century.105
Tort Liability Discourages Automation
To see why tort law discourages automation, we can look at the question of when it makes economic sense from a business point of view to replace a human operator with a computer operator. In practice, it might be complex to calculate the cost of each operator. The decision of whether to employ a computer or human operator, even where the two are capable of functioning interchangeably, may therefore be a complex one. Nevertheless, these are precisely the sorts of decisions that businesses are skilled at making-estimating uncertain future costs relatively accurately, and making decisions as rational economic actors.111 Tort liability will only be one factor to consider when deciding whether to employ a computer or human operator.
But, in the aggregate, tort liability will influence computer adoption.
As with some of these other factors, the costs of tort liability may not be straightforward.
For instance, businesses may not be directly liable for harms caused by autonomous computers.
The computer's manufacturer and other members of the supply chain will generally be liable. By contrast, businesses will generally be liable for negligent harms caused by their employees, although businesses can attempt to limit this liability, for instance, by relying on independent contractors.112 Businesses are not usually liable for negligent harms caused by their independent contractors.113
Yet even in cases where liability rests with a manufacturer/retailer or an independent contractor, it will have an indirect impact on a business. A manufacturer/retailer may pass along their costs in the form of higher prices, or, a business may need to pay an independent contractor more than an employee to have the contractor assume risk. The percentage of cost which is passed on to the business or consumer will depend on the market and price elasticity for that product.114
Yet the fact that tort liability may be indirect and complex, or that firms may purchase insurance to manage risk, does not change the fact that tort liability has a financial cost which influences behavior.
Leaving aside tort liability, if both operators cost a business the same amount to employ, the decision of whether to utilize a person or computer should be neutral. If we introduce the variable of tort liability into the decision, a human operator would be preferred. Harms caused by a person will be evaluated in negligence but the same harms caused by a computer will be evaluated in strict 112 See, e.g., Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270 (1993). There are, however, limits on the extent to which businesses can rely on independent contractors or attempt to classify employees as independent contractors. See, e.g., In re Morton, 284 N.Y. 167, 172 (1940) . As another example of how business can avoid tort liability for the actions of human operators, employers are not generally liable for intentional torts committed by employees. 113 Id. 114 See, generally, Office of Fair Trading, Cost pass-through: theory, measurement, and potential policy implications. RBB Economics, February 2014. liability. It is easier to establish strict liability than negligence.115 Strict liability does not require careless manufacturer behavior, only that a defect be present in a product. At least with regards to tort liability, the law thus favors people over machines. This will hold true as long as computers are treated as 'ordinary products' as to which strict liability is the default rule.
Computer-Generated Torts Should Be Negligence-Based
Holding computer-generated torts to a negligence standard will result in an improved outcome: it will accelerate the adoption of automation where doing so would reduce accidents. Of course, moving from a strict liability to a negligence standard would have some drawbacks. As mentioned earlier, strict liability creates a stronger incentive for manufacturers to make safer products, and manufacturers may be better positioned than consumers to insure against loss.
Indeed, this is why courts initially adopted strict product liability. However, computer-generated torts differ from other product harms in that-once machines become safer than peopleautomation will result in net safety gains.
To illustrate this, imagine that with current technology a computer driver would be 10 times safer than a human driver. In this case, it would be better that one human driver is replaced by a machine than that the same machine becomes 100 times safer than a human driver. To see why that ("It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection.") Id at 462. is so, assume a closed system with only two vehicles, where the risk of injury for a human driver is one fatality per 100 million miles driven and the risk of injury for a computer driver (which we will name model C-A) is 1 fatality per 1 billion miles driven. C-A is 10 times safer than a person. Over the course of 10 billion miles driven by the person and C-A, there will be an average of 110 fatalities. Now imagine that we are able to improve C-A an additional ten-fold such that its risk of causing injury is reduced to 1 fatality per 10 billion miles (C-A+). Then, over the course of 10 billion miles driven by the person and C-A+, there will be a total of 101 fatalities. However, if instead of focusing our efforts on improving C-A we simply replace the human driver with another C-A, then over the course of 10 billion miles driven by C-A & C-A there will be a total of 20 fatalities. Once computers become safer than people, and particularly once computers become substantially safer than people, very significant reductions in accident rates will be gained by automation. Therefore-at some point-it is preferable to weaken the incentive to gain incremental improvements in product safety in order to increase the adoption of safer technologies. Also, even under a negligence standard, manufacturers will be incentivized to improve the safety of their computer systems because they may still be liable for accidents. If Tesla's autopilot were tried under a negligence standard for failing to detect an 18-wheel truck and trailer, it would likely be held liable. A human driver would have been careless at best. Manufacturers will likely have the best information available to determine whether it would be better to pay to further reduce accident risks, e.g., whether an additional $10,000 per vehicle is worth a 1% reduction in accident risk, or whether to pay claims for additional accidents. Higher safety levels are not always better; inefficiently high safety levels may result in prohibitively high prices for consumers.116 To the extent that society is not satisfied with a manufacturer's risk-benefit analysis on optimum safety levels, non-tort mechanisms could be brought to bear, such as regulatory mandates for minimum safety standards. Finally, to the extent that risk spreading is a concern, while businesses may be better positioned to acquire insurance, consumers also have options to purchase insurance, particularly in the automobile context.117
There is justification for separating out harms caused by ordinary products like What distinguishes an ordinary product from a computer tortfeasor in this system are the concepts of independence and control. Autonomous computers, robots, or machines are given tasks to complete, but determine for themselves the means of completing those tasks. In some instances, machine learning can generate unpredictable behavior such that the means are not predictable either by those giving tasks to computers or even by the computer's original programmers.118 But the difference between ordinary products and autonomous computers should not be based on 117 Id, at 694. 118 Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied Machine Intelligence 52-55, in Robot Law (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr, eds.) (2016). Unlike Karnow, I do not agree that the relevant distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous machines should be the degree to which they are unpredictable. See id. Tort law should pursue functional solutions, and for the purposes of accident reduction it should not matter whether a self-driving car operates per expert rules or per unpredictable machine learning algorithms. See, Ryan Abbott, I Think Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57(4) B.C.L.R 1079 (2016) (arguing in the patent context that it would be impossible or impractical to distinguish between different computer architectures for determining whether a computer qualifies as an inventor, and that the distinction is irrelevant to promoting innovation). predictability, only on social and practical outcomes.119 It makes no difference to someone run over by a self-driving car what type of computer was operating the vehicle. Whether a computer acts according to fixed or expert rules created by a programmer or more complex machine-learning algorithms such as neural-networks that generate new and sometimes unforeseen behaviors, the physical outcome is the same.120 Leaving aside difficulties with courts attempting to distinguish between different types of computer architecture, ultimately, the goals of tort law should be functional. We should aspire to lower accident rates, not to create a formalistically pure theory of autonomy.
Computer-Generated Torts as a Type of Machine Injury
Not all machine injuries would be computer-generated torts. To illustrate, consider two hypothetical accidents: 1) A crane operator drops a steel frame on a passerby after incorrectly identifying the location for drop off.
2) A crane operator is manipulating a crane under normal conditions when it tips over and lands on a passerby.
In the first example, as between the machine and the operator, it seems obvious (and we may assume) that the operator is at fault (although a creative plaintiff's attorney might argue the crane was negligently designed to allow such an outcome). While the accident could not have occurred without the machine's involvement, making it a factual cause of the injury in torts vernacular, the machine did not interrupt a direct and foreseeable chain of events set in motion by the operator's action. The machine is essentially functioning as an extension of the operator, in the same way that the operator could commit a battery by throwing a rock at another person.121 In the second hypothetical, allocating fault is once again intuitively obvious. The machine is at fault rather than the operator. The operator acted with reasonable care, and the injury was due to (we may assume) a flawed crane.
These two scenarios would result in very different liability outcomes. In the first, the operator, and possibly the operator's employer, would be liable to the passerby in negligence because the operator failed to exercise reasonable care. In the second, the manufacturer and retailer of the crane would be strictly liable to the passerby even if the manufacturer had exercised the utmost care in the design and construction of the crane.
In both scenarios, an operator is using a crane in much the same way cranes have been used in construction for thousands of years. Granted, today's cranes utilize more sophisticated designs, are built from sturdier materials, and have electric power, but the basic dynamic between person and machine has not changed much. The cranes used to build skyscrapers, the pulleys used to build the Giza Pyramids, and the cranes used to build the Parthenon all involved human operators controlling the movements of a simple or complex machine to redirect and amplify force.122
Now imagine a third scenario:
3) An unmanned crane operated by a computer drops a steel frame on a passerby after incorrectly identifying the location for drop off.
The law now treats examples 2 and 3 the same way because they both involve defective products. Yet in important respects, examples 1 and 3 are more closely related. Both examples 1 and 3 involve the same sort of action and the same physical result. In example 2, a machine is being used as a tool. In example 3, a computer has stepped into the shoes of the worker; it has replaced a person, and it is performing in essentially the same manner as a person. If the computer were a person, the computer would be liable in negligence and held to the standard of a reasonable person.123
Holding computer tortfeasors to a negligence standard requires rules for distinguishing between computer-generated torts and other harms. We want to distinguish between cases in which a machine is used as a mere instrument and a person is at fault (example 1), cases in which an ordinary product is at fault (example 2), and cases in which there is a "computer tortfeasor" (example 3).
Computer-generated torts could be those cases in which an autonomous computer occupies the position of a reasonable person in the negligence calculus, and where automating promotes safety. We would only want to encourage automation when doing so would reduce accidents. It would be harmful to encourage automation while human drivers outperform self-driving cars (though, it might still be beneficial to encourage automation for a subset of cases, for instance, the class of bad drivers). To shift from strict liability to negligence, manufacturers should have the burden to show by a preponderance of evidence that a computer tortfeasor is safer on average than a person.
Implementation
Automation may occur on a more or less permanent basis or it may be situational. For example, an autonomous vehicle may only permit a machine driver, or it may allow a person to switch between human and machine control. Where automation is all-or-nothing, the relevant inquiry should be whether a specific instance of automation would be expected to result in a net reduction in accidents, rather than to reduce the risk of the specific harm that occurred. For instance, if self-driving cars were better than people at avoiding collisions with other vehicles, but worse at avoiding collisions specifically with white cars, a computer driver might decrease the overall risk of accidents but increase the risk of colliding with white cars. In a case involving a collision with a white car, a negligence standard should still apply. Better that there should be more collisions with white cars so long as there are fewer collisions in total (if collisions with white cars do not result in disproportionate harm).
Even where automation is situational, it makes sense to apply negligence. Hypothetically, if a self-driving car is on average ten times safer than a person, but only half as safe as a person in rainy conditions, a person should rely on autonomous driving software most of the time but operate the vehicle conventionally in the rain. If someone instead uses self-driving software in the rain, the computer should still be evaluated under a negligence standard. It may be difficult for a user to know in advance what circumstances an autonomous computer is likely to encounter as well as when an autonomous computer will outperform a person. In addition, the manufacturer-as the liable party-is unlikely to have input into how its computers are used situationally. Manufacturers could utilize non-tort mechanisms to prevent unsafe uses, such as by warning users that self-driving cars may not be operated in the rain, or by building in technological safeguards to prevent selfdriving cars from operating in the rain. If self-driving cars prove to be less safe than human drivers in the rain, it is likely manufacturers would still be liable for accidents in negligence.
Similarly, software used to diagnose disease based on medical imaging may outperform physicians generally, but underperform at detecting certain diseases. Ideally, this might result in human/machine collaborative review of imaging. If a machine were to underperform detecting lung cancer, for example, it should still be evaluated in negligence for its failures. The computer will likely be liable if a physician should have detected the lung cancer. In instances where a computer is generally safer than a person, but underperforms in a certain area, it is still likely to be liable in negligence when underperforming. This retains the ex ante incentive to improve an autonomous computer to reduce accidents, and allows victims to be compensated.
The basic inquiry about automation safety should focus on whether automation reduces, or is expected to reduce, overall accidents, not whether it did in fact reduce accidents in a specific instance. If Tesla can prove that it is more likely than not its self-driving cars are safer overall than human drivers, this should be sufficient to shift to negligence even in a case where a particular substitution of a human driver with a self-driving car results in more accidents. Better that there should be fewer accidents in total even if one normal self-driving car gets in more accidents than the class average.
This new standard might sometimes involve complex problems of proof. A manufacturer would have the initial burden to prove its computers are safer than people, understanding that creates an incentive to misrepresent a computer's safety.124 Even when manufacturers are acting in good faith, it may be difficult to determine whether a computer is safer than a person. Research conducted to the highest scientific standards sometimes fails to accurately predict real world outcomes.125 It may be that Tesla has reason to believe its self-driving cars are significantly safer than human drivers, but that once its cars enter the marketplace, they fail meet expectations. For instance, Tesla's research might fail to consider the reactions of drivers in states other than California to self-driving vehicles.126 In practice, automation may turn out to be safer or more dangerous, than initially predicted. Decisions often must be made based on incomplete information, and waiting for perfect knowledge risks sacrificing probable benefits at the altar of precaution.127
Adversarial legal proceedings are well-suited for resolving such factual issues, and plaintiffs could challenge manufacturer claims of safety.128 Thus, if Tesla presents proof its vehicles were predicted to cause a fatality every 200 million miles, but plaintiffs' proof shows that Tesla's self-driving vehicles actually caused a fatality every 50 million miles, that should shift the liability standard back to strict liability. It is worth noting that post-market data is not always 125 (2013) (discussing benefits of adversarial dispute resolution). Alternately, manufacturers could have a duty to evaluate the safety of automation technologies before sale, and an ongoing duty to monitor their post-market performance. This could mean that instead of plaintiffs and defendants engaging in a "battle of the experts" focused on objective safety outcomes, it would be sufficient for negligence that a manufacturer believed in good faith that its computers were safe. Plaintiffs could only rebut the presumption that a manufacturer acted in good faith. Thus, Tesla would remain liable in negligence if it could prove its vehicles were predicted to cause a fatality every 200 million miles, but plaintiffs could prove that Tesla's self-driving vehicles actually caused a fatality every 50 million miles. Unless plaintiffs could prove Tesla knew or should have known that its initial predictions were not accurate or that Tesla failed to monitor the performance of its cars. But this would create a greater risk that manufactures would fail to aggressively monitor, or that manufacturers would fail to monitor appropriately despite their best efforts. Better to base the standard on objective evidence of safety than a manufacturer's subjective knowledge. Better also to empower plaintiffs' attorneys to hold manufacturers to account than to put foxes in charge of guarding henhouses.
superior to pre-market data in every instance; sometimes pre-market data may be more predictive of future outcomes, particularly where post-market data is limited or skewed.129
It should not be necessary for a computer tortfeasor to physically replace a human operator in order for negligence to apply. It should be sufficient that a computer is performing a task which a person could reasonably do. For example, if a new taxi company goes into business using a fleet of only self-driving vehicles, computers would not have replaced human operators, but they would be doing work that human drivers could have done. By contrast, the portions of the taxis other than the self-driving software, e.g., the engine, could not be reasonably substituted. A person could drive a taxi instead of a computer, but a person could not reasonably replace the entire vehicle. So, the software operating the self-driving taxi could qualify as a computer tortfeasor, but not the other parts of the vehicle.
Once a manufacturer establishes that a computer tortfeasor is safer than a person, the negligence test should focus on whether the computer's act was negligent, rather than whether the computer was negligently designed or marketed. Again, the computer is taking the place of a person in the traditional negligence paradigm, and this would treat the computer more like a person than a product.130 It makes no difference to an accident victim what a computer was "thinking," only how the computer acted.131 Accident victims have a right to demand careful conduct regardless of how well a computer tortfeasor may have been designed.132 129 Ryan Abbott, The Sentinel Initiative as a Cultural Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMONS (Katherine Strandburg, et al., eds.) 27-30 (forthcoming) (discussing difficulties with using real world data to predict safety outcomes in an example using the medication Dabigatran). 130 To appropriate terminology used in the context of criminal law. See, e.g., Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co.,11 Ex. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Exch. 1856). 131 To appropriate criminal law terminology, we are interested in the actus rea rather than the mens rea. Dennis J Baker, GLANVILLE WILLIAMS TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 167 (2012) . There is no benefit to punishing computer tortfeasors for wrongful actions, even under civil law. 132 See, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, Lecture 3 of THE COMMON LAW, available in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 154 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995).
Applying the above rules to the crane example, Example 1 would result in human liability because the human operator acted carelessly, and the crane did not interrupt a foreseeable chain of events. It would retain strict manufacturer liability for Example 2, because a person could not reasonably be substituted for a crane. It would permit negligent manufacturer liability for Example 3 (because the computer was automating a task which a person could have performed), but only if the computer tortfeasor is safer than a human operator.
In the context of automated driving, human drivers would be liable for harms they cause because of their own driving decisions, a manufacturer would be strictly liable for harms caused by defective machines that are not automating human functions (as would be the case for MacPherson's Buick), but manufacturers would be liable in negligence rather than strict liability for errors made by autonomous driving software if the software were proven safer than a person.
Financial Liability
Autonomy exists on a continuum. In practice, the divide between an ordinary product and an autonomous computer may not be clear cut. In the self-driving car context, for example, under one widely adopted framework, vehicles are categorized on a zero to five scale based on "who does what, when."133 At level 0, the human driver does everything; at level 5, the vehicle can perform all driving tasks under all conditions that a human driver could perform. In between, there are various degrees of assistance, control, and interaction between person and machine. When computers and people share decision making, traditional principles of joint and several liability should apply.134
For instance, where a human driver and a computer driver are both at fault, as may have been the 133 See, SAE International, Automated Driving (2014) available at: www.sae.org/misc/pdfs/automated_driving.pdf (describing the SAE taxonomy). 134 case where Tesla's system failed to detect a truck and the human driver was watching a movie, both drivers could be liable for either the entire injury, or in proportion to their wrongdoing.135
Whether in strict liability or negligence, computers could not be financially liable for their harms. Computers do not have property rights, are owned as chattel, and would not be influenced by the specter of liability in the way a person might be influenced. For the purposes of financial liability, the computer's manufacturer and other members of the supply chain should still be responsible for satisfying judgments under standard principles of product liability law. Product liability law already has rules for allocating liability in complex cases where several parties contribute to the design and production of an ordinary product, or where several parties are involved in the distribution chain. Those rules could apply in a case in which Apple and Delphi jointly design self-driving car software, which General Motors licenses and incorporates in its vehicles, which vehicles are then leased by an independent retailer to Lyft. Common law liability rules could be altered by firms in the supply chain. That would be particularly likely to occur where manufacturers and retailers are large, sophisticated entities. For example, General Motors might indemnify Apple, Delphi, and Lyft in return for more favorable licensing and leasing terms.
Alternately, the computer's owner could be liable for its harms. That would be somewhat akin to treating computer tortfeasors as employees and making owners liable under theories of vicarious liability.136 It is particularly easy to imagine owners purchasing insurance for harms caused by autonomous computers in the self-driving car context, where insurance policies may soon come with a rider (or discount) for autonomous software. Owner liability might further incentivize the production of autonomous computers given that manufacturers would have less liability, but it might reduce adoption since owners would be taking on that liability. These two 135 Id. 136 See generally, Fleming James Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 Tul. L. Rev. 161 (1953) . effects might offset each other if reduced manufacturer liability were to result in lower purchase prices. Ultimately, owner liability is not an ideal solution because owners may be the most likely victims of computer tortfeasors, and because manufacturers are in the best position to improve product safety and to weigh the risks and benefits of new technologies.
In practice, the economic impact of different liability standards for accidents by self-driving cars will be seen in the cost of insurance. Insurers base their premiums on risk, and once selfdriving cars become significantly safer than human drivers, insurance rates will decrease for selfdriving cars and perhaps increase for human drivers. This should have a nudging effect on selfdriving car adoption, as financially sensitive individuals take auto premiums into account in deciding whether to drive. To the extent self-driving cars are judged under a more lenient negligence standard we would expect lower premiums for self-driving cars, further incentivizing their adoption. If manufacturers and retailers rather than car owners are held responsible for accidents, the burden of insurance would shift from owners to manufacturers, although this cost may then be reflected in higher car purchase prices.
Alternatives to Negligence
Shifting from strict liability to negligence is not the only means of encouraging automation.
The government could provide a variety of financial incentives to manufacturers and retailers to promote the creation and sale of safer technologies. In other contexts, government incentives have been effective at promoting innovation.137 For example, incentives could take the form of grants for manner, consumers trading in conventional vehicles could be provided with a voucher to purchase self-driving cars.
Even if incentives are limited to tort liability, there are still alternatives to shifting to negligence. For example, manufactures could have their liability limited through state or federal tort reform acts that might place caps on damages, limit contingency fees, eliminate joint-andseveral liability, mandate periodic payments, or reduce the statute of limitations.147
Finally, the government could promote safety by means of regulation. This could involve requirements for industries to achieve minimum safety targets, or direct requirements to adopt certain technologies.148 At the point where self-driving cars become ten or a hundred times safer than human drivers, non-autonomous driving could be prohibited.149 Regulatory solutions may be most appropriate where the benefits of automation are overwhelming, and where it is undisputed that automation would result in massive safety gains.
Yet there is reason to think that shifting to negligence may be a preferred mechanism. It is both a consumer and business friendly solution. While consumers would have more difficulty seeking to recover for accidents, the risk of accidents would be reduced. Most consumers would probably prefer to avoid harm rather than to improve their odds of receiving compensation. For businesses, it would lower costs associated with liability (which may also result in lower consumer Ultimately, to the extent that policy makers agree that automation should be promoted when it improves safety, there is no need to rely on a single mechanism. Negligence shifting could operate alongside government grants for R&D and consumer credits, combined with direct regulations in certain instances.
Shifting to negligence could be accomplished through legislation or judicial activism.
Legislative implementation may be preferable because it would be faster than waiting on courts, and legislatures may be better suited for establishing public policy.151 Indeed, automation to improve public safety is precisely the sort of activity that lawmakers should facilitate because it benefits the general welfare. If legislatures fail to act, courts could independently adopt these rules.
Lawmakers would then have the option of modifying the common law. and accept the consequences of their accidents.
IV. THE REASONABLE ROBOT
If a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of
While not outright prohibiting activities, a computer standard of care is likely to have a significant impact on behavior. Making individuals and businesses essentially strictly liable for their harms will strongly discourage certain undertakings. In the self-driving car context, it would likely result in far fewer human drivers as insurance rates for traditional vehicles become prohibitively expensive relative to self-driving cars.
A rule requiring automation at the time it first becomes available would be too harsh.
Automatons may be prohibitively expensive or only available in limited quantities. That is particularly likely early in a technology's lifecycle. It would be unfair to penalize people for not automating when doing so would be impossible or impractical. Therefore, to introduce a computer standard of care, a plaintiff should have to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a person was performing a task that could be performed by a computer and that it would have been practicable for the defendant to automate. This means that a defendant would not be judged against the standard of a computer operator where 1) no such operator existed at the time of the accident, 2) no computer operator was available to the defendant, 3) a computer operator was prohibitively expensive, or 4) there were other overriding interests for not automating (e.g., regulatory requirements for a human operator). If Tesla could manufacturer a completely safe autonomous vehicle but at a cost of $1 million dollars, it would not be reasonable to require consumers to automate.
Reasonable People Use Autonomous Computers
As an alternative to the reasonable computer standard, the reasonable person could be someone using an autonomous computer. For example, once self-driving cars become safer than people, a jury might find that it is unreasonable to drive yourself rather than to use a self-driving car. Applying the "reasonable person using an autonomous computer" to the earlier hypothetical involving a child running into the street, the human driver's negligence would not be based on failing to stop in 100 feet as a self-driving car would have, rather, liability would be based on his driving in the first place. A reasonable person would not have driven.
Under either the reasonable person or reasonable computer standard, a human driver would be compared with a self-driving car, but in different ways. With the reasonable computer standard, we would evaluate the human driver's proximally harmful act, whereas with the reasonable person standard, we would evaluate the human driver's a priori decision to automate (a bad decision would then be considered the harmful act). Maintaining the reasonable person standard would be more in line with the existing negligence regime, and it would be a less radical way to accomplish the goal of incentivizing automation to improve safety.
But while keeping the reasonable person standard would be conceptually easier, in practice it would be less desirable. We want to compare the harmful act of the person and computer, not target the initial decision to automate. It is problematic to base liability on the decision to automate because it either must focus on the question of whether automation is generally or situationally beneficial. A general focus fails to consider instances in which a person will outperform a machine.
A situational focus must still compare the harmful act of a person versus a computer.
It is likely that as autonomous computers are introduced, they will be safer at automating certain activities than others. For instance, automated computers working to diagnose disease may be superior to physicians at detecting certain conditions, but not others. Self-driving cars may be safer than human drivers on average, but not safer than professional or above average drivers.
Autonomous vehicles may also be safer under most conditions, but might be relatively poor at, for example, driving off road. So, while automation may generally improve safety, optimal accident reduction may require a mix of computer and human activity.
Suppose a self-driving car is ten times safer than a human driver generally, but only half as safe as a human driver in icy conditions. Now suppose a human driver encounters a patch of 'black ice' and causes an accident under circumstances in which she would not be negligent by comparison to a reasonable human driver. If we were to hold her to the standard of a reasonable computer, she would escape liability if the computer would have been unable to avoid the accident (which is likely if the computer is half as safe in icy conditions). However, if the reasonable person using an autonomous computer test focuses on whether an autonomous computer is generally safer, she would be liable. That test would conclude that it would have been unreasonable not to use a self-driving car since self-driving cars are generally safer. This would penalize human action even when it would be preferred.
Alternately, the reasonable person using an autonomous computer evaluation could be situational. For instance, it could be reasonable not to use an autonomous computer only in icy conditions. But this is just a more convoluted version of the reasonable computer test, because it requires evaluating whether a computer would be safer than a person in a particular instance. That essentially asks how the computer would have acted in a situation-which is the reasonable computer standard. It would then require asking, based on that knowledge, which might be impractical for a person to have, whether automating was reasonable. On top of that, it presupposes the ability to activate and deactivate automation as needed. In the black ice hypothetical, it could require the driver to know in advance of activating self-driving software whether there were icy conditions and how the computer would perform in icy conditions. It might require the driver to activate or deactivate automation only during icy conditions, or to understand whether the risk of using the computer in icy conditions outweighed the benefits of using the computer for other parts of the trip.
The Reasonable Computer Standard for Computer Tortfeasors
This Article has proposed holding computer tortfeasors to a negligence standard and comparing their acts to the acts of a reasonable person, after technology has advanced to the point that computers have been proven safer than people. It has also proposed replacing the reasonable person standard with the reasonable computer standard, again, once this point has been reached.
This means that computer tortfeasors would be held to the reasonable computer standard.
There may be instances in which it still makes sense to apply the reasonable person standard to computer tortfeasors. As described above, there will be cases in which a human defendant would not be judged against the standard of a computer, for instance, where automation is prohibitively expense or where computer operators are not widely available. We would not want to hold a computer tortfeasor to a higher standard than a human defendant. In some industries, it may take decades after the introduction of autonomous technologies for the use of such technologies to become customary, or to meet the criteria proposed earlier for adopting the reasonable computer standard.165
Eventually, once a computer becomes the standard of care, it would also be the standard for computer tortfeasors. For instance, if a self-driving Audi collided with a child running in front of the vehicle, the negligence test could take into account the stopping times of self-driving Google different test than the current strict liability standard, in which the inquiry focuses on whether a product was defectively designed or its properties falsely represented.
As computers improve, the reasonable computer standard would grow stricter. That is alright, because once the reasonable computer is exponentially safer than a person, it is likely that computer tortfeasors will rarely cause accidents. At that point, the economic impact of tort liability on automation adoption may be slight, and the primary effect of the reasonable computer standard would be to internalize the cost of accidents on human tortfeasors. For certain types of automation, it may take a lifetime until computers are exponentially safer than people.
The Automation Problem
The impact of automation goes far beyond accident reduction. Just focusing on autonomous vehicles, the widespread adoption of this technology could have revolutionary benefits. It will allow people to be more productive and mobile, and it will reduce emissions and congestion.166
One autonomous vehicle could replace up to 12 normal cars.167 Given that the average automobile spends about 95 percent of its time sitting in place, self-driving cars may also eliminate the need for parking. 168 Getting rid of parking just in the U.S. would free up space the size of Connecticut, and could allow redesigned pedestrian-friendly urban areas.169 Automation will increase freedom for the disabled, blind, and unlicensed. It might eliminate traffic lights and the need for private car ownership.170 The net result of self-driving cars could be substantial environmental, economic and social benefits.171
Driverless technologies may also result in the displacement of human workers, increased unemployment, greater wealth disparities, and a reduction of the tax base. Automation threatens the jobs of truck, bus, and taxi drivers who collectively make up about three percent of the working population.172 In other industries, automation has resulted in reduced workforces. 173 For instance, employment at computer and electronic companies decreased 45 percent from 2001 to 2016.174
Employment at semiconductor makers decreased by half during the same period.175
These are all important issues to consider in formulating automation policies, but tort law may not be the best mechanism to address these broader concerns.176 Ultimately, tort liability alone will not determine whether automation occurs. Consumer demand and the economics of automation will bring about increasing automation in the absence of laws prohibiting it.177 Tesla, for example, is planning to make all its cars self-driving, and Tesla is far from alone in automating vehicles.178179 Billions of dollars have been invested in self-driving technologies by at least 33 corporations including Apple, Google, General Motors and Uber.180
Concluding Thoughts
In the coming decades, as people and machines compete in an expanding array of activities, it is vital that appropriate legal and policy frameworks be put in place to guide the development of technology and to ensure its widespread benefits.181 It is particularly important that tort liability be structured to optimize accident deterrence.
Technological advances present new challenges to existing frameworks. At some point in the future, there are likely to be few or no activities for which computers cannot outperform people.182 Self-driving cars will eventually be a thousand times safer than the best human driver.183
At some point, computers will cause so little harm that the economics of negligence versus strict liability will be irrelevant. Autonomous computers will have become so ubiquitous that the constantly improving reasonable computer should be the benchmark for most or all areas of accident law. In fact, autonomous computers are likely to become so safe that regulatory mandates for automation will be desirable.
In the meantime, creating incentives for developing and adopting safer technologies could prevent countless accidents. It has become acceptable for more than a million people a year to die in traffic accidents worldwide, but only because there has not been a reasonable alternative until now.184 We could soon be living in a world where no one dies from unintended injury, or from medical error for that matter. Once the third and fourth leading causes of death are eliminated, that would just leave us to deal with the leading two causes of death: cardiovascular disease and cancer.
Automation may eliminate those as well.185
